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The proposed amendment would waive sovereign immunity only
in matters covered by the APA and only in suits not prohibited by
the exceptions to the judicial review provision.'0' The limitations on
relief in statutes already granting waiver would not be changed nor
would defenses available to the government be affected.' It is gener-
ally agreed that the proposed statute would not result in undue judicial
interference with governmental operations and it is viewed as the most
appropriate method to abrogate sovereign immunity. 0
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW-STANDING
THE DATA PROCESSING STANDARD AND THE RETURN OF DISCRETION-
ARY FACTORS
In spite of recent attempts by the Supreme Court to clarify and
redefine the doctrine of standing,' the lower courts still appear to be
immersed in the complexity and confusion which has historically
plagued this area of federal law.2 To a large extent many of these
the additional burden on government lawyers can be justified on the same basis as is
judicial review in general-the desirability of a judicial determination of the legality of
official action. The ideal of a government under law can be realized only if persons are
provided with an adequate set of judicial remedies against that government, its officials
and its agencies. Id. at 428.
101. Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). To this extent, the
amendment and the theory of implied waiver are quite similar. See note 62 supra. However,
the amendment is preferable since it expressly deals with many other issues in regard to sovereign
immunity which are never considered in the implied waiver theory. For example, the amendment
would eliminate the prior problems encountered by litigants in naming the proper party defen-
dant when suing the government. See S. 3568, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) and S. 598, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). See generally Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 449-59. For a discussion
of separate legislation waiving sovereign immunity in suits involving land title disputes with the
United States, see Steadman, supra note 22, at 45-79.
102. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27.00-8; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 418; 1969 Duke
Project 218-20.
103. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27.00-8; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 425; 1969 Duke
Project 218-20.
1. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co.,
390 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968).
2. The law of standing has been characterized as a "complicated specialty of federal juris-
diction." United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). It has also been
called "one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of the public law. That this
statement is undoubtedly true is evidenced by the mental gymnastics through which the courts
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problems can be attributed to the Court's use of standing rhetoric in
some of its earlier decisions to mask the actual, but unarticulated,
effectuation of discretionary considerations 3-a procedure which it
has subsequently indicated is incompatible with the theoretical under-
pinnings of the doctrine.4 It is also impossible to completely discount
as a contributing factor a basic reluctance on the part of some lower
courts to abandon subliminal discretionary powers, which had been
wrought by the subtle manipulation of both parties and issues, and
which had proven singularly effective in shaping and controlling the
controversies presented for judicial resolution.5 A final element which
must be included in the calculus is the lack of direction provided by
the Court's recent standards, that not only have proven to be impre-
cise and inherently ambiguous, but which were handed down without
any clear guidelines as to their applicable parameters under varying
factual circumstances.
As a term of art, the concept of standing eludes precise definition;'
however, when placed within the context of the constitutional schema,
its proper function becomes considerably easier to develop. Given a
basic analytical model for federal judicial review, the concept of
"pure," or constitutional, standing is concerned with the threshold
evaluation of the relationship between the particular complainant and
the issues he, is attempting to litigate.7 Theoretically at least, this
standing determination should be resolved without the incursion of
judicial discretion, as the concept is designed to perform the function
of determining whether a "concrete adverseness" exists8 sufficient to
have passed in determining standing issues." Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861
(D.C. Cir. 1970).See generally DAVIS (Supp. 1970) ch. 22.
3. However at-times-the-upreme Court's failure to raise the standing issue when clearly
applicable has proven equally confusing. See. e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965).
4. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
5. See JAFFE 503; 1970 Duke Project 279; Comment, The Erosion of the Standing Impedi-
ment in Challenges by Disappointed Bidders of Federal Government Contract Awards, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 103, 108-09 (1970).
6. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968).
7. In Flast, the Court defined standing as that aspect of a court's determination which was
designed to assure that the issues "will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Id. at 101.
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Here the Court noted that standing functioned
"to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult. . . questions."
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overcome the case or controversy requirements of article Ill.' If a
complainant is capable of surviving this initial screening he can then
be said to have the constitutional potential, but not necessarily the
right, to bring the judicial machinery to bear on the issues he has
raised. In addition to this constitutionally prescribed minimum, the
Court itself has superimposed a second level of discretionary limita-
tion on the availability of the judicial forum; 0 and, aside from seman-
tic differences caused by the wording used to denote article III cri-
teria, it has been the formulation of this second, discretionary level
which has shifted as the standing issue has developed over time.
Much of the Supreme Court's effort in this area can be viewed as
an attempt to formulate a standard which both allows the lower
courts a certain degree of flexibility, a goal which is pragmatically
necessary to insure an effective judicial system, and at the same time
provides sufficient direction to curb the potential for abuse which nat-
urally inheres whenever that flexibility is introduced. However, a dis-
sipation of the clarity and uniformity of the decisions dame as a logi-
cal outgrowth of the early standard which the Court had established
to meet this problem-the litigant's ability to allege and demonstrate
the violation of some "legal right,"'" which involved a showing either
that judicial review had been expressly granted by statute, or that
there had been some deprivation of the complainant's common-law
rights. 12 While superficially simple and easy to apply, as a practical
9. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, or other public Min-
isters and Consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or
Subjects. U.S. CONST. art. Il1, § 2.
10. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253-58 (1953). This statement is subject of course
to the right of Congress to resolve these questions to the extent that its decision does not conflict
with Article III. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1910). See also Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 346 (1935) (concurring opinion).
I1. See Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939), where the Court defined
"legal rights" as those of property, arising out of contracts, protected against tortious invasion,
or founded on a statute expressly conferring a privilege. See also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
302 U.S. 464 (1938); The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924); Edward Hines Trustees
v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,447 (1887).
12. Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). See 1970 Duke Project 264,
for examples of express statutory grants. However, until recently, few statutes expressly pro-
vided for such judicial review and thus most of the law in this area has been based on common-
law developments. See generally JAFFE 502.
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matter the "legal right" language proved to be unworkable; any
evaluation of whether a particular claimant's legal rights had been
violated necessarily depended on the merits of his allegation-
merits which theoretically could not be reached unless the court had
first determined standing to exist.
This inherent circularity allowed the individual courts wide lati-
tude to expand or contract the parameters of standing depending upon
their reactions to the circumstances in any given case.13 Further, be-
cause the standing determination came procedurally prior to any eval-
uation of the issues on the merits, the exercise of judicial discretion
at this point proved singularly effective in controlling, or avoiding
altogether, those particular issues which the courts felt for policy
reasons should not be litigated, 4 even though in many instances the
unarticulated rationale behind denying review might have been as
easily and perhaps more properly effectuated by other jurisdictional
concepts. 15 The deeper the question of "pure" standing was buried in
discretionary policy considerations, and the more hidden the real de-
terminative factors were, the more complex and logically incompre-
hensible the standing question became.
While several noteworthy exceptions were allowed to the basic
13. Professor Davis comments on the plight of a plaintiff attempting to challenge illegal
agency action:
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action always has standing if a legal
right of the plaintiff is at stake. When a legal right of the plaintiff is not at stake, a
plaintiff sometimes has standing and sometimes lacks standing. Circular reasoning is
very common, for one of the questions asked in order to determine whether a plaintiff
has standing is whether the plaintiff has a legal right, but the question whether the
plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion, for if the plaintiff has standing his
interest is a legally-protected interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right. 3 DAvis
217.
14. It has been argued that the retention of the "legal right" test was in all probability
motivated by
various ideas not appearing on the face of formal opinions such as the notion that the
law of standing can keep judges from assuming too much governmental power, that it
can limit courts to appropriate subject matter, that it can help assure competent presenta-
tion of cases, and, above all, that it can protect against a flood of litigation that might
so much overburden the courts as to produce a disasterous deterioration in the quality
of all that courts do. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 723.
But see Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450, 470-71 (1970). See
also Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (statement by Burger, J.).
15. E.g., justiciability, ripeness, mootness, exhaustion and abstention. See generally Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 171 n.3 (1970).
Vol. 1972:1151
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
"legal rights" test,' 6 it was not until Flast v. Cohen 7 that the Supreme
Court began to move away from a substantive evaluation of the com-
plainant's allegations in determining his standing to litigate. In Flast
the Court specifically emphasized that the standing issue was involved
only with a focus on the particular party seeking review, and not on
the substantive content of the issues he sought to raise.'" Implicit in
the Court's approach to the problem 9 is a tacit recognition that it had
16. Examples of such exceptions can be found in challenges of administrative decrees. See
Matson Nay. Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 405 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1968). See gener-
ally B. SCHWARTZ. AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 185-86 (1962). But
cf Comment, Competitors' Standing to Challenge Administrative Action-Recent Federal
Developments, 48 N.C.L. REv. 807, 820-21 (1970). If the competition created by the agency
action is itself illegal, then the injured competitor will be granted standing even in the absence
of any specific "legal right" to be free from competition generally. See Scanwell Labs., Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); NASD, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). A
second general area that has been excepted from the "legal right" requirement is that of suits
brought to vindicate the public interest. See also Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S.
4 (1942); Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated on suggestion of
mootnessper curiam, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). See generally JAFFE 459-500.
17. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
18. The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get
his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wished to have adjudi-
cated. . . . [W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the
person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a
particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable ....
[T]he question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated
will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution. Id. at 99-101.
19. Flast granted standing to a taxpayer for purposes of challenging the constitutionality
of a federal program which provided funds to parochial schools for purchases of textbooks and
other educational materials. The Court outlined a dual-nexus approach to the standing issue:
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must
establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked.
Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises
of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the
Constitution. It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in
the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. . . .Secondly, the taxpayer must
establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringe-
ment alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enact-
ment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congres-
sional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond
the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. When both nexuses are established, the
litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will
be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction. Id. at 102-03.
See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968), asserting that
the Court's distinction between the right to challenge under specific and non-specific clauses of
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become necessary to gradually strip away the discretionary considera-
tions to expose more clearly the underlying constitutional issue. The
movement appeared to be directed toward forcing the true decisional
elements into the open by attempting to limit the opportunity for
exercises of subliminal judicial controls. Thus while the constitutional
requirements remained basically unchanged, there was a fundamental
shift in the judicially-imposed limitations, which had the immediate
effect of expanding the class of litigants accorded an opportunity to
obtain judicial relief,20 and also, quite naturally, of expanding the
scope of the issues subjected to review.
Data Processing v. Camp-The Promulgation of a New Standard
The process of separating the discretionary considerations from
the "pure," or constitutional, test for standing,2 1 was significantly
advanced by the Supreme Court, at least in theory, in two recent
concurrent cases: Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp2 and Barlow v. Collins.Y In these cases the Court
finally laid to rest the traditional concept that standing questions were
concerned with the existence or non-existence of some judicially cog-
nizable "legal interest." Having thus completely abandoned the pre-
viously acknowledged criteria, if as a practical matter any could really
be said to have existed, the Court went on to promulgate a new
standard comprised of two symbiotic requirements, one constitutional
and one judicially self-imposed, which were to be satisfied before
standing would be granted.24 First, the complainant must demonstrate
the Constitution elevates form over substance and is not viable. Professor Davis also argues that
an individual should have the same right to challenge a statutory violation as he does a constitu-
tional one because "[a] person who has standing to challenge for one kind of illegality that
adversely affects him necessarily has standing to challenge for another kind of illegality that
adversely affects him to the same extent." Id. at 604. But see Douglas, The Bill of Rights is
Not Enough, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 207, 227 (1963), asserting that judicial rules are in fact often
designed to protect preferred constitutional rights.
20. See, e.g., Davis, 37 U. CHI. L. REv., supra note 14, at 457, pointing out the Court's
unwillingness since the Flast decision to dismiss a case for lack of standing, as indicative of the
liberalizing trend. But see 23 VAND. L. REV. 814 (1970), arguing that the Data Processing
standard is fundamentally the same as the "legal interest" test. See also Note, Standing to
Challenge Federal Administrative Actions in the Wake of Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, I LOYOLA U. (CHI.) L.J. 285, 297 (1970).
21. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
22. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
23. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
24. A third element that comprises a part of the Court's initial determination, but that is
theoretically not a part of the standing issue, is the question of reviewability which the Court in
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that he is capable of sustaining his article III case or controversy
burden. To do this he must be able to allege that the challenged action
has caused him some form of "injury in fact, economic or other-
wise." ? Second. the complainant must demonstrate that there at least
arguably exists some basis upon which his complaint could be predi-
cated if the court finds it to have substance. This in turn is met by
the ability to allege that the particular interest he seeks to have pro-
tected falls "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. '20
The two tests were designed to work in conjunction with one another
in evaluating the complainant and his allegations; and in every in-
stance where a complainant is capable of alleging an "injury in fact"
with relation to the particular "zone of interests" within which his
allegations place him, he has met the Data Processing test."
Data Processing couched in terms of whether or not judicial review of the agency action had
been precluded. 397 U.S. at 156. See generally DAVIS 498-520 (discussing fundamental issues
involved in reviewability). See also 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (1970) (concurring opinion),
25. 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
26. Id. at 153.
27. See generally DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 22; Davis, 37 U. CHI. L. REv., supra note 14, at 450;
Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public
Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); 1970
Duke Project 264-81; The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARM. L. REV. 1, 177 (1970);
Comment, Standing to Sue: A Commentary on Injury in Fact, 22 CASe W. RES. L. REv. 256
(1971); Comment, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: The Concept of Personal
Stake, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 570 (1971); Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The
Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MicH. L. REV. 540 (1971); Comment, 48 N.C.L. REv., supra
note 16, at 826-30; Note, The Essence of Standing: The Basis of a Constitutional Right to be
Heard, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 438 (1968); Note, I LOYOLA U. (Cm.) L.J., supra note 20, at 285; 23
VAND.,L. REv. 814 (1970).
But it is important to note, most particularly in the context of organizational suits, that the
Data Processing test is not the exclusive standard which can be applied by the courts. The
Supreme Court explicitly inferred that a second set of criteria was not precluded by its decisions
in Data Processing and Barlow:
The third test mentioned by the Court of Appeals, which rests on an explicit provision
in a regulatory statute conferring standing and is commonly referred to in terms of
allowing suits by "private attorneys general," is inapplicable to the present case. 397
U.S. 150, 153 n.1 (1970).
As an initial matter, private attorney general suits necessarily demand that the requirements
of article III be met, thus yielding the same basic evaluative and interpretive flexibility that
occurs under Data Processing. Compare Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. granted, 401 U.S. 907 (1971), with EDF, Inc. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
728 (E.D. Ark. 1971). The two approaches, however, differ in the "rule of self-restraint" which
they impose upon the courts. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 253 (1953). Given a showing
of "concrete adverseness," private attorney general suits have traditionally required that the
claimant further allege at least an implicit grant of statutory authorization to maintain his
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A broad survey of the decisions after Data Processing, however,
reveals that the new standard has thus far failed to eliminate the
problems it was designed to overcome. The lower courts have not been
been able to develop a consistent approach to standing questions
through the use of the standard, and the result can be seen in the wide
divergence of interpretations that the courts have given the functional
variables in the standard-"arguably," "zone of interests," and
"injury in fact"-in resolving the issues that have surfaced. But of
greater concern, the existence of such conceptual divergence is indica-
tive of the underlying potential for the re-introduction of discretionary
factors which the standard was, at least in part, created to restrict.
This disparity between the intended and actual applications of the
standard can be seen as a product of a very real inability to apply the
Court's theoretical formulations in a practical context. Analytically
the Court has approached the standing issue from the premise that
substantive determinations are to be involved solely with the merits
of the claim, which necessarily demands that standing questions
action, limiting the issues which he can raise only to those which will vindicate the "public
interest." See Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
320 U.S. 707 (1943); cf. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940). See also
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). However, the recent trend has been
to expand the scope of the test by abandoning the requirement of statutory authority, substitut-
ing in its stead a presumptive grant of standing where the claimant has alleged that agency
action has unlawfully or arbitrarily deviated from the controlling statutory scheme. See Peoples
v. Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that presumptive standing
would be granted a complainant who alleged that the Secretary of Agriculture had unlawfully
deviated from statutory requirements in a food stamp program); Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dealing with the requirement of an administrative illegality
and declaring that the public interest specifically lies in protecting against the exercise of
arbitrary powers by the agencies). The result has been a gradual shift in the basic determination
from whether Congress intended to benefit the class of which the complainant is a member, to
whether Congress intended to immunize the particular agency action from judicial review.
NASD, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
For example, in National Helium Corp. v. Morton, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1971), a
corporate complainant brought an action to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's termina-
tion of certain government helium contracts on the grounds that the decision was procedurally
defective and contrary to the public interest. Although the claimants were clearly incapable of
sustaining their burden under the Data Processing "zone of interests" test, standing was granted
to them as private attorney generals. While there was no nexus between the alleged injury
(financial) and the interest being asserted (public), the court held that under the private attorney
general theory "[iut is not a part of our function to weigh or proportion these conflicting
interests. Nor are we called upon to determine whether persons seeking to advance the public
interest are indeed conscientious and sincere in their efforts." - F.2d at
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should be divorced from the substance which underlies them. How-
ever, as a practical matter, this theoretical analysis is incapable of
being applied in a concrete situation since any evaluation of a com-
plainant's allegations, however minimal, inescapably involves some
weighing of their legal validity. Yet when practical demands allow this
opportunity for substantive evaluation, it becomes a relatively simple
matter to judicially manipulate the definitions accorded the variables
of the standard to encompass as broad an evaluation of the substance
as the bias of the particular court feels appropriate in any given
instance. Thus in analyzing an allegation in terms of the "injury in
fact" .r~quirement, for example, it becomes a relatively simple matter
to shift emphasis subtly from the abstract finding of an injury as
required by the Court and apparently defined according to basically
objective, non-legal standards," to a purely substantive evaluation of
the alleged injury as a product of judicial willingness, or power as the
case may be, to vindicate the "legal right" which necessarily underlies
it. 9 In a similar manner the "zone of interests" requirement can be
manipulated from an abstract and relatively detached determination
emphasizing the "arguably" element of the Data Processing stan-
dard, and using a broadly construed "zone" as its basis, 0 to a careful
substantive examination into the actual scope of the particular statute
or constitutional guarantee in question as it directly applies to the
litigant's complaint .3 Once this definitional manipulation begins to
occur, the resolution of standing questions evolves into a function of
28. In Data Processing the complainants filed suit contesting an interpretive ruling made
by the Comptroller of the Currency which authorized national banks to provide data-processing
services to their customers. It was claimed that as a result of the ruling the data-processing
industry would be subject to increased competition which would create substantial financial
harm to the members of the organization. Here both the district court, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D.
Minn. 1968), and the court of appeals, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), denied complainants
standing on the grounds that they did not have a private legal interest, had failed to plead a
legal wrong that was recognized at law, and had not proven that their particular status was one
protected by any statute. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the harm to the organization
and its constituent members was sufficient for article Il1 purposes.
29. See DAVIs 222. But see JAFFE 501.
30. See Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Association of Data Pro-
cessing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
See also Comment, 69 Micn. L. REV., supra note 27, at 551-55; Comment, NASD 1,
SEC-Standing to Sue, Economic Power, Banks and Mutual Funds, 55 VA. L. REv. 1493
(1969); 50 B.U.L. REV. 417 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971),
petitionfor cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 26, 1971) (No. 71-708).
[Vol. 1972:115
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W-1971
the particular forum rather than solely an evaluation of the relation-
ship between the litigant and his allegations. However the inference
is clear from the Data Processing opinion, particularly in light of the
Court's application of its standard in Barlow,32 that the Court did not
intend the two tests to be substantively applied; nor did it seem to feel
that such a result was a conceptually viable one. As a result, in many
instances the resolution of standing questions has become as much a
function of the particular forum as it is of the relationship between
the claimant and the issues he is attempting to raise.
To a certain extent, however, the problems that have arisen under
Data Processing have evolved from the Court's having been over-
inclusive to the point of having stripped away judicial discretion from
the standing issue without concurrently providing an acceptable outlet
for discretionary distinctions. For example, under the Data
Processing standard there is no allowance for a "best plaintiff rule,"
nor is there any effective method of curbing piecemeal adjudication.
In every instance where the complainafnt can carry his standing bur-
den as to even one issue in a complex factual situation, Data
Processing requires the court to hear his claim on that issue regardless
of any external considerations which may militate against mainte-
nance of the suit. As a result some courts have felt forced to circum-
vent the Supreme Court's directives where no other alternative ap-
pears, or where they seem to feel the need of stricter controls over
access to the forum. The inherent flexibility of the Data Processing
standard, produced as it is in part by its definitional imprecision and
32. In Data Processing the Court said that the "zone of interests" test was designed to
evaluate the "interest sought to be protected by the complainant." The Court then went on to
examine the effects of the APA and the broad scope of interests which had been found sufficient
to constitute the basis for standing in other cases. See Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (1965); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962). The
Court noted economic as well as non-economic "values to emphasize that standing may stem
from them as well as from the economic injury on which petitioners rely here." 397 U.S. at
154. Throughout this portion of the opinion, the Court seems to be equating the concept of an
injury and an interest such that the language "the interest sought to be protected by. . ." could
be quite consistently read to mean "the injury sought to be protected against by .... " Such
a reading would mesh with the balance struck by the Court in Data Processing, where the injury
was the economic loss caused by allegedly illegal competition and the "zone of interests" was
evaluated in terms of protecting against that competition. It would also be consistent with the
Court's analysis in Barlow, where the recognition that the "relevant statutes" were designed to
protect complainants was tied to the allegation that they had suffered "injury in fact from the
operation of the amended regulation." Id. at 163; cf. Comment, 69 MICH. L. REv., supra note
27, at 551-55.
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in part by its impracticality, has permitted the courts to accomplish
these subliminal objectives while still purporting to follow the direc-
tives of the Supreme Court.3 3 However, the resulting attempts to use
standing rhetoric to justify decisions based on considerations not pro-
perly included in the standing determination under the Court's formu-
lation has caused the confusion which has pervaded this particular
area of the law.
A dramatic illustration of the confusion precipitated by the com-
bination of vague standards and the subtle re-introduction of discre-
tionary factors can be found in two recent cases decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in which two panels of the court
managed to deny standing under diametrically opposed rationales
while still purporting to be using the Data Processing standard. In
Sierra Club v. Hickel3l the court denied standing to a national envi-
ronmental organization which had sought to challenge the Secretary
of the Interior's grant of a permit allowing the commercial develop-
ment by a private business enterprise of an area which included part
of Sequoia National Park. The court held that the complainant
lacked standing because he had failed to allege injury to a "direct and
obvious interest, ' 35 which the court held necessary to meet the dictates
of article III, and then went on to assert that "injury in fact" was
the sole criterion that was to be applied under Data Processing. In
discussing its dismissal of the "zone of interests" test the court said
that
[tihe significance of the language is not entirely clear. . . . [W]e submit that
it does not establish a test separate and apart from or in addition to the test
which the Court first looked to in Camp [injury in fact] . . . '[s]tanding to
sue,' as the phrase indicates, refers to the posture of the plaintiff and not to
the 'legal interests' to be unravelled.36
However even a cursory examination reveals that this interpretation
is incompatible with the concept of standing as it evolved in Data
Processing and was applied in Barlow. The Supreme Court made a
33. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (1970) (concurring opinion), where Justice
Brennan accepted the majority's "injury in fact" standard but rejected its "zone of interests"
test on the grounds that any inquiry into such a "zone" was concerned with the question of
reviewability and not with the standing determination. See generally Comment, 69 MICH. L.
REv., supra note 27, at 560.
34. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 907 (1971).
35. 433 F.2d at 32-33.
36. Id. at 31.
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point in each of those cases to apply both tests to the allegations, even
going so far as to number them in Barlow, 37 and was explicit in
establishing that each test performed a different function in the stand-
ing determination. Where "injury in fact" operated to insure satisfac-
tion of article III requirements,
[t]he question of standing. . . concerns, apart from the 'case' or 'controversy'
test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complain-
ant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 38
While this elimination of the "zone of interests" test from the stand-
ing determinant in Sierra Club does have some support in the Su-
preme Court 9 and is espoused by certain of the commentators," it is
definitely not the view taken by the Data Processing majority.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 41 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied standing to residents of an
apartment complex in a suit against its owners for allegedly engaging
in discriminatory rental practices. Here the court did not deny that
the litigants had suffered the alleged "injury in fact," a finding which
seemingly would satisfy the Sierra Club test and terminate any further
inquiry into the standing issue. However the court then went on to
evaluate the claim substantively, holding, after a careful examination
of the statutes upon which the complaint was based, that under the
first statute review was precluded,42 and under the second the litigants
37. 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970).
38. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (emphasis added).
39. See note 33 supra.
40. See generally DAvis ch. 22; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE
L.J. 965 (1969); Davis, 35 U. CHI. L. REv., supra note 19; Jaffe, 116 U. PA. L. REv., supra
note 27; Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of"Committed to Agency Discre-
tion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968).
41. 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 197 1),petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov.
26, 1971) (No. 71-708).
42. Fair Housing Title (Title VIII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610,
3612 (1970). Here the court made a careful examination of all relevant sections of Title VIII
and the applicable legislative history before holding that the Act gave the Attorney General
exclusive right to sue to correct patterns and practices of discrimination. The court then went
on to make its finding that, because the allegations did not assert that any of the complainants
were the direct object of a discriminatory housing practice proscribed by the Act, the injury
alleged was the result of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination through the maintenance of
a "white ghetto" and review was thereby precluded.
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were not "arguably within the zone of interests" which it protected.43
In an analysis reminiscent of pre-Flast substantive "legal rights"
determinations, the court of appeals reasoned that because the com-
plainants were unable to allege that "they themselves had been denied
any of the rights granted by . .. ?" either statute, access to the forum
would be denied. However, the substantive approach adopted in
Trafficante is irreconcilable with both the "injury in fact" approach
used in Sierra Club and the standard promulgated in Data
Processing. If the court had followed Sierra Club, the "zone of inter-
ests" test should have been rejected altogether; and, under Data
Processing, the court would have been restricted to an examination
solely of the zone of interests to be protected by the statute and not
to the specific legal rights that it in fact had created. 5
In looking behind the use of the Data Processing language in
Sierra Club and Trafficante, however, the decisions can be seen to
have a common thread in the unstated, but clearly evident, reluctance
of the courts to abandon discretionary control over the availability of
the judicial forum. In Sierra Club the court redefined "injury in fact"
to include only those injuries which it considered to be "direct and
obvious,"46 and while this is clearly inconsistent with the demise of
the requirement that there be a direct, personal injury sustained to
overcome article III constraints," the court was thereby enabled to
exclude a particular class of litigants which it may have felt was
motivated by interests less adverse than those of other potential com-
plainants then presently available to bring suit.4" Having thus inter-
43. All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1970).
44. 446 F.2d at 1160 (emphasis added). The court carefully reviewed Jones v. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968), and the cases which followed it, distinguishing the present case on the
grounds that while it was clear that the purpose of Congress was to forbid racial discrimination
affecting the civil rights enumerated in the Act, the court could find no clear indication that
Congress intended to allow third party enforcement of these rights, or an independent cause of
action by one not so discriminated against or interfered with.
45. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
46. 433 F.2d 24, 32-33 (9th Cir. 1970).
47. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
48. The real underlying issue that appears to be at the center of the controversy in this case,
however, is the question of whether groups such as the Sierra Club will be able to challenge
agency actions which affect the environment in areas where no local plaintiffs exist to give
standing under the traditional approach. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ
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preted "injury in fact" to allow this type of evaluation, any discre-
tionary limitations which might have been imposed by a "zone of
interests" test became completely subsumed under the court's flexible
"injury in fact" definition. In Tralficante it seems equally probable
that the substantive evaluation of the "zone of interests" test was
dictated by discretionary considerations not clearly explicated on the
face of the decision. Other plaintiffs that the court felt were demonstr-
ably more appropriate to litigate the issues involved had subsequently
filed suit, and the court, in order to leave itself free to make a later
determination on the merits, narrowly construed the "zone of inter-
ests" test to preclude review by the complainants in the action then
before it."5
Experience with the "Zone of Interests" Test
Even with the confusion over the proper application of Data
Processing, however, several noticeable trends have begun to emerge
from the recent cases. These trends indicate that at the present time
the courts are generally continuing the pre-Flast expansion of poten-
tial litigants by liberally applying standing requirements. But it
should be emphasized at this point that while movement is clearly
toward encouraging more widespread access to the judicial forum, the
flexibility inherent in the "zone of interests" and the "injury in fact"
tests which has allowed such liberalization carries with it the inescapa-
ble potential for a change to a more restrictive outlook on the part of
the courts. Thus, just as the policy of minimizing the consideration
of extraneous factors in the standing determination may be
easily undermined in the free play of the Data Processing language,
the analyses involved in evaluating expansion are equally applicable
to movement in the opposite direction.
With the "zone of interests" test, the problem is esentially two-
fold. First, the court must delineate the scope of the interests which
will compose the applicable "zone" of that "zone of interests" sur-
v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conf., 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); cf. Powelton Civic Homeowner's Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See
generally Comment, Conservationist's Standing to Challenge the Actions of Federal Agencies,
I ECOLOGY L.Q. 304 (1971); Comment, Judicial Review of Administrative Action Involving
Environmental Problems, 5 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1090 (1971); 71 COLuM. L. REv. 172 (1971); 16
VILL. L. REv. 729 (1971).
49. See 446 F.2d at 1163 n.10.
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rounding the statute invoked. Second, the degree of attenuation allow-
able between the interests claimed by the litigant and those clearly
within that "zone" must be established so that the "arguably" con-
cept will have some meaning.
Scope of the "Zone." While there are undoubtedly instances in
which the boundaries of the "zone" are clearly established, and where
a party is unquestionably either within or without it, in the vast
majority of cases the resolution of this question will depend upon
what the court perceives as the applicable legislative intent." The
courts have, however, long recognized that this type of determination
is extremely imprecise due to the paucity of relevant materials and the
nature of the subject matter involved; and this lack of precision be-
comes particularly apparent when the courts are required to determine
legislative intent without delving into substantive issues. 5' The cases
after Data Processing indicate a progressively liberal approach to the
"zone of interests" test through expansions in the breadth of inquiry
into legislative history, and the concurrent relaxation of demands for
a tight nexus between statute and alleged injury. In Lodge 1858,
A.F.G.E. v. Paine5 2 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit examined the applicable civil service laws,53 the statute creat-
ing the administrative agency, and the legislative history of subse-
quent'relevant statutes to determine that a statutory scheme existed
which protected the allegedly infringed interest of the claimants. Then
in Harry H. Price & Sons, Inc. v. Hardin," the Fifth Circuit held,
without specific reference to any statutory provisions of legislative
history explicitly including the class of which he was a member, that
the indirect effects of a regulatory scheme on the complainant were
50. See Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1940);
Stringham, Crystal Gazing: Legislative History in Action, 47 A.B.A.J. 466 (1961).
51. The Supreme Court itself seemed to recognize the necessity of broadly construing both
the "arguably" and the "zone of interests" standards to favor review even where the connection
between the interest claimed and the applicable legislative intent appears tenuous. See Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970). See generally DAvIs ch. 22.
52. 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
53. Here employees of NASA challenged the agency's dismissal of civil service employees
while it continued to retain contract workers. Id. at 884; accord, Chris Berg, Inc. v. United
States, 426 F.2d 314 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See also National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
54. 425 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
55. See 1970 Duke Project 270.
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sufficient to bring him within its "zone of interests" for purposes of
meeting the Data Processing requirements. Following these cases the
appearance of a judicial willingness to grant standing where the basic
concerns of the statute involved merely appeared to touch upon the
invaded interest came as a logical advance. In Ely v. Velde, 51 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted standing
to residents of an area described as a "uniquely historical and archi-
tecturally significant rural community ' 57 to challenge a Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration grant designed to finance construc-
tion of a penal institution which the state intended to locate in the
community. Noting that the "relevant statute" for standing purposes
under section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act 58 need not
necessarily be the one upon which the agency has relied in making its
determinations,59 the court went on to hold that the statutes which the
complainants had invoked were "designed to foster both improve-
ment and maintenance of areas such as [the one here], when the
national interest is served by so doing."6 The question of whether
protection of this particular area was encompassed in that "national
interest" was left for a later determination on the merits; however,
the initial finding that there existed such a "zone of interests" was
made by the court without any express evaluation of either the statu-
tory language or the legislative history of the statutes upon which it
had relied. Similarly in Delaware v. Pennsylvania New York Central
Transportation Co.61 the District Court for the District of Delaware
granted standing in an action brought to challenge the Army Corps
of Engineers' issuance of a permit allowing a railroad company to
dike and fill the shoreline of a navigable river. The claimants were
multiple, ranging from the state to an individual resident of the area,
56. 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971).
57. Id. at 1089.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
59. Here the court noted that while cases involving section 10(a) "generally consider the
relevant statute to be the one upon which the particular agency relies for authority of its actions,
the court does not consider these cases controlling on the point." 321 F. Supp. at 1091-92. In
support of this the court cited Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), which would also indicate
that the courts do not consider the "zone of interests" test merely to be a restatement of the
language in section 10(a), as has been contended. See generally DAVIS ch. 22; Comment,
Standing for Review of Actions by Federal Administrative Agencies, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 206
(1970).
60. 321 F. Supp. at 1092.
61. 323 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del. 1971).
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and the court held, without examining either statutory language or
legislative history, that the alleged injuries were "obviously" within
the "zone of interests" of the relevant statutes, 6 apparently basing
its decision on a reading of the statutes' nominal concerns rather than
on any analysis of their content.
However, where the courts do deny standing, even under circum-
stances in which it would appear equally "obvious" that the interests
asserted by the claimant are not protected by the statute which he has
invoked, the courts appear to feel constrained to explicate the reason-
ing behind their decision to deny the claimant access to judicial re-
view. Thus in Intercontinental Placement Service v. Hodgson6 3 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied an
employment agency standing to contest the Secretary of Labor's sus-
pension of an immigration occupational precertification list under the
Immigration and Nationality Act64 only after establishing by a care-
ful examination of the statute and the applicable legislative history
that the congressional intent was totally unrelated to the alleged in-
jury.6" Here the court did not deny that the complainant had suffered
an injury as a direct result of the Secretary's actions, but a clear
differentiation was made between the allegation of an "injury in fact"
and the allegation necessary to meet both aspects of the Data
Proce~sing standard. While the injury to the employment agency may
have given rise to an undeniable interest in the Secretary's actions, the
relevant standing question under Data Processing was limited to
whether or not the statute cited had been designed to protect that
interest. 6
62. Here the court first noted that "no explicit statutory provision is necessary to confer
standing." Id. at 492, then held inter alia that the complainants had "alleged adverse effects
on the environment, a subject obviously within the 'zone of interests' to be protected by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190, 83 Stat. 852." 323 F. Supp.
at 492. See Hardin v. Kentucky.Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968).
63. 52 F.R.D. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
64. See section 212(a)(14) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14)
(1970).
65. The precertification list involved here was a part of the 1965 amendments to the Act,
and the court found that it was designed to protect, through regulation, the national economy
and the country's existing work force. The complainant had a direct interest in the list, having
used it in negotiating contracts between aliens and employers in its principal service, locating
jobs for entering aliens. However, standing was denied because none of the interests alleged by
the complainant could be matched with the congressional intent behind the amendments. 52
F.R.D. at 378.
66. See also Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, - F. Supp. - (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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The Meaning of "Arguably." At the same time that some courts
are expanding the "zone of interests" by presuming legislative intent
where superficial review of a statute would appear to favor protection
of the claimant's interest, a second avenue in the liberalization of
standing requirements concentrated on the functional definition to be
accorded the "arguably" variable of the test. While it is patent that
a narrow reading of this term can be highly restrictive, 7 particularly
when coupled with a substantive evaluation of the applicable "zone
of interests," there appears to be little movement in this direction. For
example in P.A.M. News Corp. v. Hardin" the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit granted a private news service stand-
ing to enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture from establishing a similar
service on an allegation that the direct governmental competition
would infringe on the claimant's first amendment rights. In finding
that both tests of the Data Processing standard had been met, the
court held that the "[a]ppellant's legal position may not be correct,
but it is not frivolous. Appellants are entitled to present their legal
theory in court, and it is clearly incorrect to deny them that opportun-
ity by prejudging the substantive issue."6" Implicit here is the recogni-
tion that the "zone of interests" test functions primarily as a control
over the issues the claimant will be allowed to litigate, the "arguably"
concept necessarily being broadly construed to insure that it impinges
to the minimum extent possible upon the substance of the case.
Similarly in Sierra Club v. Hardin7° the District Court for the
District of Alaska granted a national conservation organization, and
various local complainants, standing to maintain a class action
against the Secretary of the Interior challenging his decision to sell
certain national forest timber to a private business enterprise. Here
the court first recognized the limiting function that was to be per-
formed by the "zone of interests" test, 1 but went on to hold that,
67. See the discussion of Trafficante, supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
68. 440 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
69. Id. at 257.
70. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
71. Basically the constitutional constraints imposed on the courts by the standing issue
demand an examination of the claims in the allegations purely in terms of the complainant's
ability to demonstrate sufficient adverseness for proper judicial. review, see note 8 supra and
accompanying text, but there is no constitutional requirement that the complainant demonstrate
that adverseness as to every allegation he makes before access to the courts will be allowed in
the first instance. Under the more traditional approach to standing problems there was no
conscious attempt to segregate the issues arising out of a single challenged action, and standing
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given the strong presumption favoring judicial review7 2 and the im-
portance of environmental issues, where the connection between stat-
ute and alleged interest is tenuous the "arguably" aspect of the test
should control, even in the face of some reservations on the standing
question.7 3
Relaxation of Procedural Requirements. A third avenue of expan-
sion in the "zone of interests" test can be seen in the emergence of a
willingness on the part of some courts to relax the procedural require-
ments of Data Processing. For example, in Northwest Residents As-
sociation v. Department of Housing and Urban Development 4 a local
homeowners' association and individual property owners filed suit to
challenge FHA approval of mortgage payment subsidies which were
designed to finance the construction of what the claimants alleged
would be saturation-type housing. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin found that the necessary allegation of an "in-
jury in fact" had been made, but that the complainants had failed to
make any allegation of being "affected or aggrieved .. .within the
meaning of any relevant statute" under the Administrative Procedure
Act and thus had made no showing that they could satisfy a "zone
to litigate one issue often was enough to permit litigation of any other issues that were involved.
With Data Processing, however, the inclusion of a "zone of interests" test may function to
separate each issue for standing purposes. By focusing attention on each issue the Data
Processing test may thereby induce courts to unnecessarily restrict a complainant's role even
after he has demonstrated the requisite elements of standing as to part of his claim. Thus in
Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971), the court held that
Standing to challenge the sale and permit under acts which clearly evince an intent
on the part of Congress to promote 'aesthetic, conservational and recreational' interests,
however, does not necessarily imply standing to challenge other aspects of the transac-
tions under statutes which merely reflect a general intent to protect the citizen in his
capacity as a taxpayer. Id. at I11.
72. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); cf Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943). See also Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970).
73. Cf. NASD, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds sub
nora. Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). But see Judge Burger's separate
opinion where he stated that
I am unable to set aside my grave doubts as to Appellees' standing to institute and
maintain these suits. However, in the uncertain state of the law as to standing, there is
something to be said on both sides of that question. I therefore resolve my doubts in favor
of the Appellees . . . .I am influenced substantially, as I indicated at the outset, by the
need for judicial examination of the important questions raised. 420 F.2d at 108.
See also City of Lafayette v. SEC, F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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of interests" test.75 The court here not only made its own determina-
tion that such a "relevant statute" existed, but then went on to hold
that for standing purposes the complainants were "arguably within
the zone of interests" that were protected by it, thus making the
requisite Data Processing showing.
Experience with the "Injury in Fact" Test-Collective Organizations
An examination of recent cases also reveals that the potential for
discretionary input is not limited solely to manipulation of the "zone
of interests" test. Particularly with the elimination of a requirement
that the claimant sustain a direct, personal injury to overcome article
III limitations, 76 the "injury in fact" test is subject to a similar quan-
tum of judicial manipulation and the problems raised in trying to
reconcile the variables comprising this test-the nature and the degree
of injury which will be recognized as sufficient to provide the requisite
"concrete adverseness"-are evident in every area. The basic issues
that arise, however, can be clearly illustrated by an examination of
the variety of judicial responses toward collective organizations which
have brought suit to vindicate the rights and interests of their mem-
bers.
Whenever a collective organization attempts to assume the role of
litigant, the basic conceptual issue is the conflict between its ability
to adjudicate the legal interests of its members, as individuals or in
the aggregate, and its ability to adjudicate only those interests accru-
ing to it as a legal entity in some way divorced from its membership.
In Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of
Labor,7 7 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that a building contractors' organization lacked standing to con-
test hiring restrictions placed in federally funded construction con-
tracts which were designed to favor the employment of minority
75. Here the court based initial jurisdiction on 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), which specifies that
in order to have standing a party must be "affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of a
relevant statute." Standing for the claimants in the present case was ultimately based for Data
Processing purposes on § 2 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701(t) (1970). See 325 F. Supp. at 68.
76. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608. 615 (2d Cir. 1965). The
elimination of this requirement marked a definite shift in the Court's emphasis towards article
III problems. For an example of the traditional view, see, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). See generally Comment, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv.,
supra note 27.
77. 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
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groups.7" The court clearly differentiated between the legal position of
the organization and the rights of its members by granting each of
the individual contractors standing because it found them "person-
ally" affected by the agency action, but at the same time denying the
organization standing on the grounds that it lacked the requisite "per-
sonal stake" in the outcome of the litigation. The decision was bot-
tomed on the court's interpretation and application of the general
concept that standing questions must focus solely on the particular
party seeking review and not on the issues being litigated.7" Here the
organization, as such a party, was deemed unable to allege a sufficient
"injury" to itself; but as a practical matter the decision seems unreal-
istic, as it is difficult to conceive of an organization lacking adversity
while being composed entirely of adverse parties. s0
This restrictive application of the "injury in fact" test to the
collective organization was also followed in Sierra Club v. Hickel,8 t
where the organization had not alleged a direct injury to any of its
members who could assert a discernable local interest in the outcome
of the litigation. The court treated this defect in the allegations as
having effected a shift in the status of the organization from its repre-
sentative capacity to one where it functioned solely as a distinct legal
entity asserting an injury to its own interests. With this shift the court
also demanded a concurrent shift in the showing required to meet the
dictates of article III, the "injury in fact" evaluation being made
solely in terms of the organizational entity and not in terms of its
membership. In denying standing, the court held that while the Sierra
Club had alleged an interest in the Secretary's actions its interests
were not sufficiently "direct and obvious" to constitute an "injury
in fact" under the Data Processing12 test, thereby clearly differentiat-
78. The hiring requirements being contested here were prescribed in all federal contracts,
and federally funded construction contracts, as a part of the controversial Philadelphia Plan
which was designed to give assistance to minority-race construction workers. The Philadelphia
Plan became effective on September 29, 1969, having been implemented on the authority of the
Secretary of Labor under Executive Order No. 11,246, §§ 201-405, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965),
as amended, Exec. Order No. 375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1965), as amended, Exec. Order No.
11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969), and provided that all contractors not only cease discrimina-
tory practices against minority workers, but required that they take affirmative action to insure
their employment.
79. 311 F. Supp. at 1007.
80. But see Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 908 (197 1). See also Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Ore. 1971).
81. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970). See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 30. But see West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441
F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); lzaak Walton League of Am. v. Macchia, - F. Supp. - (D.N.J.
1971).
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ing the legal status of the collective organization from that of its
individual membership.
The restrictive interpretation of the "injury in fact" test used by
the court in Sierra Club, however, appears to be in stark contrast to
the far more pervasive liberalization of standing requirements
wrought by the majority of recent cases. Concurrent with the liberal
construction of the "zone of interests" test there has been a wide-
spread movement to broadly construe the-elements of "injury in fact"
so as to expand the issues which will be capable of being brought for
judicial review. This trend has been particularly evident in the area
of environmental law; however, it is by no means limited to such
suits. 4 The same basic issue of the sufficiency of injury required of a
collective organization to meet an "injury in fact" test was indirectly
raised in Federation of Homemakers v. Hardin8 where a consumer
organization sought to challenge the Secretary of Agriculture's au-
thorization of allegedly misleading labels on certain foodstuffs.86 The
83. For further examples of the possible methods of limiting the "injury in fact" test see
Dugan, Standing, 'The New Property,' and the Costs of Welfare: Dilemmas in American and
West German Provider-Administration, 45 WASH. L. Rnv. 497, 515 (1970). The Ninth Circuit
ostensibly predicated its decision in Sierra Club on the failure of the national organization to
join with "local conservation organizations made up of local residents and users of the area
affected by the administrative action." 433 F.2d at 33. While this failure to join local residents
does have a certain surface appeal, and has been utilized by other courts in assessing standing
claims, see, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), it
cannot be reconciled with the Data Processing standard. Under Data Processing the proper
focus is solely to be on the party seeking judicial review, and thus the court is required to
evaluate only the particular litigant against the issues raised in the allegations. Therefore the
joinder or non-joinder of any additional parties should theoretically be completely irrelevant to
the ability of each individual litigant to meet the Data Processing standard. While the presence
of local interests may be deemed either beneficial or essential, depending upon the interpretation
accorded the "injury in fact" test, such interests must be alleged as a part of the organization's
complaint and cannot be imputed from other parties to the same action. Compare Sierra Club
v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970) (see notes 34, 81 supra, and accompanying text), with
Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949
(1970); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N.M. 1971); EDF, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971) and Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v.
Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
84. See, e.g., Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1970); National Welfare Rights Org.
v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970); EDF, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
EDF, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v.
Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970).
85. 328 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1971).
86. The complainants alleged violations of the Wholesome Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601 et
seq. i-/)), which was enacted to protect the health and welfare of consumers by insuring that
they have access to wholesome and properly marked meats. "It is essential in the public interest
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District Court for the District of Columbia granted standing on the
basis of the injury caused to the organization's consumer constituents
without any showing that a particular member of the organization
had been directly harmed by the Secretary's actions, and without any
examination of whether the organization itself had suffered an injury
separate from that to its members. While it remains unclear whether
the district court's integration of individual membership interests into
those of the representative body, will be applicable in every case, 7 this
holding clearly appears more consistent with the approach adopted
in Data Processing than the holding in Sierra Club. Although one of
the parties in Data Processing was an organization comprised of data
processing services, the Court granted standing to the claimants on
an allegation of a competitive injury which could only have been
sustained by one of the members of the association."8
Conclusion
The fundamental problem with the Data Processing standard lies
in the ability of individual courts to make subjective determinations
which are capable of being rationalized under a purportedly objective
standard. While the inherent flexibility of such a formulation may
prove over the long run to be the most valid approach to the standing
issue, that flexibility results in a situation where the biases of the court
applying the standard become the crucial factors rather than the
standard itself. Up to now this flexibility has manifested itself in an
expansive liberalizing of standing requirements to the extent that, for
example, in Reservists Committee to Stop the War v. Laird"0 the
District Court for the District of Columbia granted standing without
that the health and welfare of consumers be protected by assuring that meat and meat food
products distributed to them are wholesome, not adulterated, and properly marked, labeled, and
packaged .... Id. § 602.
87. A clear illustration of the potential problems which may arise in this type of situation
is where the collective organization is a labor union composed of both whites and blacks, and
the issue is whether the union will strike to contest alleged discrimination in hiring practices, or
to effectuate a minority-group minimum employment quota. But cf. Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1971) (granting
standing to the union to challenge the validity of the government's wage-price freeze without
any discussion of the standing issue); Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Connally,
F. Supp. - (E.D. Mich. 1971). See generally Comment, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV., supra note
27, at 594-600.
88. 397 U.S. at 152.
89. 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971).
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any allegation of a traditionally cognizable "injury in fact." In
Reservists Committee an association of military reservists, and cer-
tain of its individual members, had brought a declaratory judgment
action challenging the military status of certain members of Congress
based on the broad constitutional prohibitions in article I against dual
office-holding." The grant of standing was predicated solely on the
complainants' position as citizens, and in abandoning the "injury in
fact" language the court outlined in its stead three bases for its deci-
sion: while the injury involved might well be hypothetical, the hypoth-
esis was inherent in the constitutional provision itself; the issue being
litigated was extremely narrow and involved a self-executing provision
of the Constitution; and the interests asserted by the complainants
were "undoubtedly" those which the provision in question was de-
signed to protect. 91
The decision in Reservists Committee is clearly a departure from
the more traditional attitude toward standing questions but, while
limited in large measure to its facts, it is also indicative of the degree
to which judicial discretion functions in the standing area and the
expansiveness with which the courts have generally been willing to
approach individual cases. While the discretionary flexibility cur-
rently serves to allow courts to protect private interests which hereto-
fore were considered outside the purview of the judicial power, it is
nevertheless true that in the absence of any objective criteria establish-
ing the appropriate parameters of acceptable discretionary considera-
tions, the lower courts will remain free to expand or contract access
to the forum for reasons completely unrelated to the standing issue.
Therefore the task presently facing the Supreme Court is to articulate
a set of guidelines to govern standing questions so that future deci-
sions will evolve out of a more uniform recognition of the proper
factors which should be held to comprise a valid request for judicial
relief. Until that is done, there can be little hope that any logical
consistency will obtain in this area of the law.
90. No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such
time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a member of
either House during his Continuance in Office. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
91. But see Lamm v. Volpe, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1971) (where the concept "citizen
standing" was rejected in a suit brought under a claim that there had been a violation of tenth
amendment rights).
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